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Decomposition: 
Musical Occampanyments 
to Stravinsky's Poetics of Music 
TERENCE J. MAHER 
I am a believer in Wagner's art and theory, a condition I 
have come to by conversion. As is typical with converts to 
most anything, I have reacted to my former blindness with an 
extra measure of fervor and zeal. The positions enunciated 
in Stravinsky's Poetics of Music stand in stark contrast to 
nearly everything about my new-found artistic faith. There 
stands now on the horizon of musical thought a theory which, 
while continuing the directions taken by Stravinsky in the 
Poetics, not only further negates Wagner's theory and art, 
but also calls into severe question the theories espoused in 
the Poetics. 
This paper will outline briefly the positions taken by 
the Poetics on the matter of the relationship between music 
in sound and music in performance, then present relevant 
concepts advanced by the deconstructionist school of 
literary critics concerning the relationship between writing 
and speech, principally as enunciated by Jacques Derrida l in 
Part One, what he calls the theoretical matrix, of his Of 
IA good introductory essay on Derrida, accompanied by 
similar essays on related figures in contemporary French 
thought, can be found in Jonathan Culler, "Jacques Derrida," 
in Structuralism and Since: From Levi-Strauss to Derrida, 
ed. John Sturrock (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1979). 
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Grammatology,2 and finally speculate upon their application 
to sounded and written music. 
The Poetics argues against what it takes to be the extra-
musical accretions of Wagnerian theory, and repostulates 
what it takes to be musical integrity. "The phenomenon of 
music is nothing other than a phenomenon of specula-
tion. • • • The elements at which this speculation necessar-
ily aims are those of sound and time •••• Composing, for 
me, is putting into an order a certain number of these 
sounds according to certain interval-relationships."3 
Anything more betrays music's integrity, invites an under-
standing of music on extra-musical considerations, con-
siderations other than the speculative putting of sound 
through time, and results in an understanding of music that 
is rather literary than musical. A false sense of per-
formance accompanies this, in which the performer aims not 
at realization in sound of the printed score but at delivery 
of a supposed inner meaning of the music. "It is not 
without reason that the worst interpreters usually tackle 
the Romantics. The musically extraneous elements that are 
strewn throughout their works invite betrayal, whereas a 
page in which music seeks to express nothing outside of it-
self better resists attempts at literary deformation."4 
Accepted in this is a notion of notation versus speech 
that has been the accepted concept since the Greeks, namely, 
that notation exists outside of the reality it notates, that 
writing is a means, albeit imperfect, of recording speech, 
but is extraneous to the phenomenon of speaking. In other 
words, it records but it does not share in the nature of 
that which it records. The word is the reality, its written 
form simply an external record of it; the music is the real-
ity, its written form an external record of it. 
The impossibility of these external records capturing all 
of that which they record, and thus the impossibility of the 
records actually being records, has long been recognized. 
Writing, notation has always been suspect precisely because 
of its imperfect nature. Plato speaks of the misunderstand-
ings that may arise in reading a written text: the author is 
not there to correct our misreadings and thus we may fall 
into errors through the written word that do not occur when 
being spoken to. These are analogous to the problems of in-
terpretation. In confronting a musical score, we consider 
ourselves to be in the presence of an imperfect record of 
2Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Spivak tr. (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
3Igor Stravinsky, Poetics of Music, Knodel and Dahl tr. 
(New York:Vintage, 1947) pp. 28,39, passim. 
4Ibid ., p. 130. 
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the composer's intentions. Notation cannot convey 
everything, and thus the performer is responsible for 
decisions on matters that cannot be notated. Misreadings 
arise, which we are more accustomed to call problems of per-
formance practice, and all of this arises from the exterior-
ity of writing, of notation, to the phenomenon it notates. 
Stravinsky himself acknowledges this difficulty: "But no 
matter how scrupulously a piece of music may be notated, no 
matter how carefully it may be insured against every possi-
ble ambiguity through the indication of tempo, shading, 
phrasing, accentuation, and so on, it always contains hidden 
elements that defy definition because verbal dialectic is 
powerless to define musical dialectic in its totality."5 
Let us here recognize the exteriority of music notation 
to music in sound Stravinsky completely accepts. He funda-
mentally distinguishes the piece of music from its notation; 
he then lists several operations the notation may take to 
insure itself as a complete record of the piece, which the 
record is not a part of but simply a record, then acknowl-
edges that the record will never wholly record this totality 
which does not need a record to be a totality. Music is 
music in sound, a totality; the notation is a completely ex-
terior record of it. 
Notation can then be regarded as a supplement to the 
music itself, as writing is seen as a supplement to the 
spoken word. What is assumed is that the entity or 
phenomenon which the supplement supplements exists as a 
totality, as a plenitude. Yet, if it is whole, if it is a 
plenitude, why should there be supplements? The traditional 
answer is the one given above: the supplement is marginal to 
the plenitude, and unrelated to it in essence. Another an-
swer may be that perhaps the totality was not total after 
all, that insofar as the supplement functions as a sub-
stitute for its plenitude, perhaps the plenitude was not an 
entity previously existing in its entirety for which a sup-
plement later arose, but perhaps both plenitude and supple-
ment create each other, arise from each other in a primary, 
primal, or originary process as yet unrecognized. 
The fundamental exteriority of the signifier to that 
which is signified is recognized. A word and that for which 
it stands have no necessary relation to each other. That 
which in English is signified by the word "tree" is 
signified by other sounds in other languages. Modern 
linguistics adds the insight that what is signified to an 
English speaker by "tree" is not the trees that actually 
grow in the park, but the associations with that word that 
exist in his own mind under the term "meaning." Tree stands 
5Ibid ., p. 127. 
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not for tree but for the meaning in each speaker's mind as-
sociated with it. The signifier is an arbitrary external 
entity, the signified is a mental construct; the two 
together create a sign which exists in a system of signs. 
When the verbal signs are spoken, we experience the 
phenomenon of presence. When he whose mind contains the 
signifieds produces their signifiers, he has the experience 
of his own presence, the sense of hearing himself speak. 
The process of signification allows us to conceive 
ourselves as entities, as presences, and an intermediary 
stage such as writing, the notation of signifiers, has no 
role in that. In fact writing, notation, by its assumed ex-
teriority to the signifier and thus to the presence of self 
experienced in the simultaneous location of signifier and 
signified in the speaker, disturbs this perception of 
presence and thus is regarded as suspect and relegated to a 
role considered to be marginal, exterior. 
Yet no signifier exists except within its own system: we 
do not understand "tree" by itself, but rather, involved in 
the recognition of that signifier is the recognition of what 
it is and what it is not. In other words, part of re-
cognizing "tree" is recognizing that it is different than 
the others, that "tree" is not "not-tree." Corresponding to 
this is a system of signifieds which, for the purposes of 
our example, splits the world into tree and not-tree. 
Signifiers and signifieds alike betray an identity based on 
differance, and in that differentiation each identity dif-
ferentiated bears a trace of that from which it has been 
differentiated: "tree" bears within it a trace of "not-tree" 
or else it could not have its identity as "tree." No entity 
can remove from itself the trace of that which it is not or 
else it ceases to be that which it is. Every presence con-
tains within itself, precisely as the condition of being 
present, the trace of that which is absent. There can be, 
therefore, no absolute presence, no plenitude, because 
presence or plenitude in the very process of construing it-
self or of being construed as presence or plenitude, must 
contain a trace of absence or partialness. 
Absence is then not the opposite of presence but part of 
the very nature of presence. Presence and absence are not 
primary givens that oppose each other, but in fact arise to-
gether, create each other, and maintain within each other as 
trace through the process of differentiation. The origin, 
then, or that which is original as given, the originary is 
neither presence nor absence but difference. One thus sees 
that difference does not produce opposites, and that in dif-
ference what is taken to be exterior, to be marginal, to be 
supplementary is in fact interior, integral and essential. 
Absence is not exterior to presence but part of its inter-
ior; exteriority itself is part of interiority. Because 
difference leaves traces of that from which something is 
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differentiated within the thing, presence, in constructing 
itself, also deconstructs itself. Presence constructs it-
self by relegating absence to its exterior, but this very 
relegation by which presence creates itself leaves the trace 
of absence within itself, and thus presence deconstructs it-
self through its need for absence as a trace to construct 
itself. We are thus in an irreconcilable dialectic of con-
struction and deconstruction, where as we see the difference 
needed to construct presence we also see the deconstruction 
of presence into difference. 
Derrida has given this seeming contradiction, this 
paradox of a thing constructing itself through de-
constructing itself, the term differance. The French term 
means both to differ and to defer. Insofar as anything, in 
reality, in signifieds and signifiers, exists, it exists by 
defering all else to its exterior, by differing. 
Differance, then is both the passive existence of difference 
which is the precondition of the formation of signs as 
signifiers and signifieds and the active acts of defering 
and differing that effect difference. Derrida also calls 
differance by the term espacement, or in English "spacing," 
a term perhaps more suitable for English speakers. 
Finally, differance or spacing, that originary process, 
is not speech but a writing, or rather an arche-writing, an 
originary inscription not of letters or graphemes on a page 
but an inscription on the fabric of reality itself-in fact 
the inscription, the arche-writing, is reality itself. If 
writing in the ordinary sense has been excluded as exterior 
to language of any kind, it has been to preserve the il-
lusion of presence, of plenitude, particularly that of the 
speaker, through the phenomenon of hearing himself speak. 
But the very factors which were the basis for the relegation 
of writing to marginality or supplementarity have turned out 
to be the characteristics of language itself. What is dis-
covered at the origin is not a presence but differance, a 
spacing, an inscribing, an arche-writing, a process of in-
terrelated constructing and deconstructing. To represent 
this in writing in the ordinary sense, one writes 
terms-usually only those whose meaning radically requires 
the concept of presence, of completion, of plenitude, of an 
interior whose exterior is wholly other-to acknowledge the 
necessity of such deluding tools to communicate at all, but 
one crosses them out, or puts them under erasure (sous 
rature) to show that such presences or plenitudes can only 
be such by virtue of the trace and simultaneous origin of 
absence and partialness. 
Most especially must "trace," differance, etc. be placed 
under erasure, because they are not presences whose 
presences deconstruct any pretenders to presence, they are 
the origin of presence though no such thing as orlgln ex-
ists. This is not to say that origin disappears, but rather 
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that it never appeared, and though the concept of an 
originary non-origin of differance, or trace, or spacing 
must to be communicated be expressed in language based on a 
metaphysic of presences and plenitudes whose interiors are 
wholly other from their exteriors, the erasure expresses 
awareness of the limits of language systems to express 
something that does not arise by distinction from its op-
posite because it is precisely that arising by distinction 
that is being expressed. 
Let us now turn our attention to the applicability of 
these things to the relationship of musical sound to musical 
notation. While much of current musical thought is carried 
on in terms of linguistic theory, of symbology and semi-
ology, it may be objected that the thought expressed above 
does not apply to musical linguistics because the 
signifiers, the sounds, refer to a different kind of 
signified in the human mind. To put it another way, though 
in the case of both verbal and musical language one deals 
with a symbology, musical symbols are not discursive as are 
verbal symbols. 
This objection does not apply, for the reason that the 
analysis of the process differance in signification has been 
carried out without reference to the kind of signifier or 
signified. In other words, it does not matter whether or 
not the symbols are discursive or non-discursive since 
symbols in general are a product of, and produce, 
differance. The very splitting of symbol into discursive 
and non-discursive is differance, and so even if our 
critisisms did not apply, they would apply by the logic of 
supplementarity, that what is excluded as exterior is yet 
included as trace in the interior. Discursive and non-
discursive arise to-gether in differance; that the question 
should arise of the applicability of deconstruction to non-
discursive symbols answers itself in the affirmative. 
Derrida takes up music in the course of Part Two of the 
Grammatology, which is a discussion of Rousseau, specifical-
ly in the course of his discussion of Rousseau's Essay ~ 
the Origin of Languages. Derrida notes that, in spite of 
the title, it is principally Rousseau's disquiet at certain 
developments in music that prompts the book, even though 
music itself is only taken up in chapters twelve through 
nineteen of it. "Why is this?" he asks. Because music does 
not come before language, because music arises from not sim-
ply sound but from the human voice. In other art forms one 
is confronted by an inanimate object but in music one is 
confronted by a voice, even when it is instrumental, that 
announces the presence of another like being. This is why 
music moves humans and why lower animals have no music. 
Music, as a phenomenon of voice, is thus a development in 
the phenomenon of language. In their origins speech and 
song are the same, yet have pursued ever diverging paths in 
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history. But as spoken language loses more and more of its 
musical quality, sung language or song loses much of its 
former energy through the accumulation of rules. 
Rousseau thus identifies the elements of differance but 
does not recognize them as such and bemoans their effect. 
Rousseau recognizes the continuing divergence of speech and 
song, but does not recognize that the degeneration of an 
original speech-song is in fact the inevitable outcome of 
its arising, that differance articulates reality with the 
appearance of the phenomenon speech-song but that the very 
process of the articulation or inscription makes inevitable 
its further articulation into speech and song. What Rous-
seau identifies as degeneration is actually differance, and 
differance has always already begun. Speech and song take 
the relationship of supplement, of exterior, to the imagined 
pure originary speech-song, but the logic of supplementarity 
points to speech and song having their inception in the same 
process as speech-song itself, namely differance. 
Derrida does not recognize all this as simply an example 
of differance, but rather as differance itself. Spacing, 
differance is precisely what is known in music as interval. 
But the origin of interval happens in the always-already of 
differance. The era of great art preceded that of great 
thought in ancient Greece as the entailments of precisely 
the divergence of speech from song, as Rousseau recognizes, 
but the eventual accession of speech-thought over song-art 
happens by precisely the same differance that is the crea-
tion of speech-song. What one finds, then, is an infinity 
of cycles of degeneration-regeneration, where what is lost 
through degeneration is compensated for by a regeneration. 
The loss to thought of the powers of song is compensated for 
by refinements in thought. 
Differance interrupts presence through spacing, interval. 
The essence of art as traditionally understood is imitation. 
Art is thus supplement to reality or to Nature, to which it 
adds nothing and yet adds something. This is the danger of 
art to which Plato called attention in The Republic. Since 
art imitates nature, it is superfluous to reality, adding 
nothing to it, but since it does add to reality it is 
dangerous because it is not reality but rather imitation. 
To put this into more modern terminology, signifier imitates 
signified. 
When signifier no longer imitates signified, perversion 
enters. Money does not imitate that which it buys, which is 
why the love of money itself is a perversion; it is a love 
of a signifier apart from its signified, possible because of 
the non-imitative nature of money with respect to what it 
buys. And yet even in an imitative relationship of 
signifier and signified a spacing has arisen which leaves 
room for perversion. Imitation in differance integrity 
creates perversion. Imitation is not assaulted by an evil 
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from without, but rather deconstructed from within. 
If art indeed imitates nature, then everything in art is 
a signifier, and we are moved not by the signifiers them-
selves but by their signifieds. painting moves us not by 
color but by that which its images signify; music moves not 
by sound but by that which the sounds signify, namely 
feeling or emotion. This signification occurs of course in 
the context of culture-music that is deeply moving in one 
culture is not in the next-but the point is rather that in 
all contexts of culture this signification of feeling oc-
curs. The effect of art is not in art itself, but in that 
which it signifies, and this through imitation. In music, 
this imitation is produced by melody, by melodic line, as in 
painting it is produced by the drawn line. 
But as we come back to the earlier point: the instrument 
of imitation, the line, be it melodic or drawn, rises in 
differance and differance deconstructs imitation in the very 
process that gives rise to it. The degeneration of the 
melody of speech-song into the calculated interval melodies 
of song happens by the same process, differance, that 
generated the melody of speech-song. 
Rousseau's dispute with Rameau shows he does not under-
stand this. He vehemently denies Rameau's dictum that 
melody comes from harmony. Harmony to Rosseau is further 
degeneration into calculation of melody, and to posit its 
priority to melody is nonsense. Melody is the parent, 
harmony the child which seeks to overthrow it. The calcula-
tions of harmony do not imitate, and they please us only as 
a result of their harmonic inter-connections, which are 
operations of melody. Rameau, he maintains, is blind to 
this, a blindness which is moral before it is theoretical. 
He criticizes Rameau for ethnocentricism, laying down on the 
basis of recent European music the basis of all music. But 
Derrida points out that this criticism is itself 
ethnocentric in its claim that harmony is a peculiarly 
European musical evil. 
Rousseau himself recognizes that harmonic calculation al-
ready resides in melody; it is rather that harmonic calcula-
tion has anything to do with musical imitation that he 
denies. This imitation, in speech, song, or speech-song, 
has to do with accent, the rise and fall of tone or tone of 
voice. Yet what is rise and fall but differance, and the 
cold science of harmonic calculation proceeds from the same 
process that created the supposed originary accent. The 
sustained use of the analogy of painting to music is no ac-
cident: as interval is no example of differance but 
differance itself, this analogy is analogy itself. In fact, 
the word chromatic comes from the Greek chroma, meaning 
color: Rousseau maintains that a calculation of chromatics 
no more results in musical art than it results in spatial 
art. 
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Harmony is supplement to melody. Musical melody is sup-
plement to the melody of undegenerate speech-song. But 
Rousseau cannot see this process as always-already hap-
pening. There was, in the sense that there must have been, 
a pure orIgIn, an incorrupt pure origin that has been at-
tacked. In other words, there fuust have been an originary 
presence-in the instance discussed here, speech-song-that 
has degenerated from attacks by evils from without-song, 
harmony. Rousseau sees all the elements of differance, but 
cannot see differance because he is firmly rooted in the 
age-old metaphysics of presence, of perfect plenitude. He 
cannot see that even in speech-song, with its undiminished 
powers of expression, that an imitative substitution has 
begun, of precisely the same nature of the degenerations he 
decries, a substitution that interrupts presence or 
plenitude and that by its very nature as language, as dis-
course, deconstructs presence through differance. 
Derrida's main purpose in dealing with these matters is 
to get on to the relationship of writing to speech, but ours 
is not. Rousseau provides a fine example of the deceptions 
of the logic and metaphysics of presence, of the idea 
plenitude exists, that a thing has no reference to that 
which it is not. He is of interest to musical theorists 
because one of his concerns is music, and it is in this con-
cern for music that he provides such a fine example of 
logocentricism. 
Let us restate, this time without reference to the 
Rousseau-Rameau dispute, the central insight gained by ex-
amining their dispute as analyzed by Derrida. It is this: 
there is no original music; insofar as music has an origin 
it originates in differance, and those things that seem to 
be additions from without-a science of intervals, of 
harmony, notation-in the role of supplement to a plenitude, 
to a whole, in fact originate from within, as it were. Or 
rather, the plenitude and its supplement arise from the same 
orlglnary process of differance. Presence, in presenting 
itself, de-presented itself; a plenitude or whole, in so 
constructing itself, deconstructs itself. To compose a 
plenitude decomposes an apparent prior plenitude, ad 
infinitum; the decomposition of the composition inheres to 
the composition; this process is the always-already, the ir-
reconcilable dialectic of differance. 
The deconstructionist view of music-which is deconstruc-
tion itself, if what this paper is saying has been fol-
lowed-lends support to the anti-Romantic theories of The 
Poetics of Music. The idea of an "inner meaning" to music, 
of music expressing something other than itself, of the com-
poser as a priest in art, of the performer as the revealer 
of the inner meaning-all this deconstruction shows to be 
nothing more than the metaphysics of presence, the illusion 
of hearing oneself speak, the illusion that there are 
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plenitudes such as meaning, art, composer, etc., who speak. 
But deconstruction also shows the more modern ideals of 
musical integrity to be illusions as well: music expresses 
nothing outside itself, scrupulous adherance to the com-
poser's intentions, and so on. 
The logic of supplementarity allows no escape, as it al-
lows no entrance. What are "absolute music," "composer's 
intentions," "faithfulness to the score," or the 'musical 
dialectic in its totality' that Stravinsky speaks of but 
again a metaphysic of presence, an illusion that such self-
contained plenitudes exist? 
Stravinsky himself, in one of the opening quotations of 
this paper, admits that no matter how carefully notation is 
done it can never notate the totality of the piece of music. 
"Verbal dialectic is powerless to define musical dialectic 
in its totality."6 We have seen, though, that here speaks 
the metaphysics of presence, a belief that a plenitude, the 
piece of music, exists and now is to be supplemented from 
without by notation. And if that notation is incomplete, as 
it admittedly is, we can see by the logic of supplementarity 
that the composer's alleged intentions must also be incom-
plete. That which was thought to be the exclusive 
characteristic, the excluding characteristic, of the ex-
terior supplement is found to be characteristic of the sup-
posed plenitude it supplements. Within the logocentric 
metaphysics of presence, this is nonsense. Upon the recogni-
tion of differance, of trace, of spacing, the logic of sup-
plementarity points in only this way: the incompleteness of 
the notation indicates the incompleteness of the composer's 
intentions. In the strictest sense of the terms, it is im-
possible to notate, it is impossible to compose. 
Even within modern musical philosophy of performance, 
more than one performance or reading is possible within the 
dictum of fidelity to the score. It is not the deconstruc-
tionist contention that more than one reading is possible 
that is novel, for this problem has long been recognized as 
attendant upon the nature of notation, but rather the in-
sight that no plenitude such as a composer's conception ex-
ists to be notated, that the conception shares the same in-
completeness as the notation, that the "musical dialectic in 
its totality" shares all the flaws of the "verbal dialectic" 
used to notate it, and this precisely because there is no 
totality, but rather differance, always-already. 
Could not electronic music be excused from this? There 
is no score, no performance, no interpretation; the composer 
himself assembles precisely what he wants to hear, or does 
hear. Or does he? The tape is not what the composer hears, 
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but a record of it. It is an imitative image, a supplement 
to a supposed plenitude, a record. There is no escape for 
electronic music; it simply follows a different course-which 
is to say, the same course. 
And so we are led from sign to sign, wherever we go. We 
do not arrive at the end of a chain of signifiers at some 
kind of signified that escapes signification, because we do 
not arrive at the end of a chain of signifiers. Every 
signified is in turn a signifier, and we do not find a 
transcendental signified, as Derrida calls it, a presence, 
Being, at the end. Reality is something like a dictionary: 
each word is defined by other words, and if we look up the 
words used to define one word, we find other words, and so 
on. By the very system that allows us to look up words, 
there is no ur-word, no transcendental word, to which the 
dictionary reduces and which is knowable apart from the 
relation it bears to its supplements, the other words in the 
dictionary. It is no accident that the dictionary, the 
words-book, should so precisely microcosm the differance of 
the language and reality for which its words are signs. 
Reality remains unknowable. 
Where does all this lead us, or leave us? Nowhere. That 
is not a problem, nor an objection; there is no Somewhere to 
be led or left. These lines of thought have been presented, 
so to speak, as occampaniments to honor a thinker who wrest-
led mightily with the unknowableness of it all-William of 
Occam. His conclusion was that, reality being unknowable, 
propositions are not statements about reality and philosophy 
is simply the study of the function of terms in proposi-
tions. Terms do not refer to reality, only to each other. 
Stravinsky and Occam portrayed music and language respec-
tively as self-contained systems, that do not depend upon 
their reference to a larger reality. Beginning in agreement 
about the larger reality as illusion, deconstruction reveals 
that the smaller reality is illusion too, that self-
contained presence simply is not. The deconstruction of 
composition we have presented, so to speak, as decomposi-
tion, offering it as a musical occampaniment to Stravinsky's 
Poetics of Music. 
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Pe , thoU~h perhaps not, differance was ac 
in ancient China: 
The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth. 
The named is the mother of ten thousand things. 
These two spring from the same source but differ 
in name; this appears as darkness. 
Darkness within darkness. 
The gate to all mystery. 
73 
Can a Wagnerian accept all this: trace, spacing, 
differance and all their implications? The answer might 
lead us to a philosopher who both recognizes the unknowabil-
ity attendant upon what has been termed here differance and 
yet demonstrates the possibility of the experience of 
presence under those conditions. But, as the lady said, 
tomorrow is another day. 
This paper does not wish to engage in any controversy; 
neither endorses nor opposes deconstruction or decomposi-
tion. Its primary purpose is to set forth to the best of 
our ability Derrida's deconstruction and to experimentally 
speculate upon its application to the relation of sounded to 
written music. 
7 Lao Tsu, Tao Te Ching, Feng and English tr. (New York: 
Vintage, 1972). 
